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Batson v. Kentucky Reflections Inspired by a Podcast
Nancy S. Mardei'
ABSTRACT
An episode of More Perfect, a podcast devoted to the US. Supreme Court,
focused on Batson v. Kentucky, which just marked its thirtieth anniversary. This
podcast serves as the starting point for reflections on Batson v. Kentucky, a case in
which the Court maintained the peremptory challenge while trying to eliAminate
discriminatory peremptory challenges. The podcast contributes to our
understanding of Batson in several ways. First, it allows listeners to hear from
participants in the case and how they viewed their situation at the time. Second, it
considers whether Batson has been effective in ridding jury selection of race-based
peremptory challenges. A growing number of academics and judges take the view
that Batson should be abandoned and peremptory chalenges should be elimuinated
Third, the podcast raises the question whether eliminating the peremptory
challenge represents a loss offaith in America, as one lawyer suggests. This Article
challenges that notion and argues that clminating the peremptory challenge
represents a faith in America and in Americans to perform their role as jurors.
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INTRODUCTION
An episode of More Perfect, a podcast devoted to the U.S. Supreme Court,'
focused on Batson v. Kentucky.2 In the segment entitled Object Anyway, reporter
Sean Rameswaram wanted to learn more about Foster v. Chatrnan,4 which was
then before the Supreme Court. Foster raised the simple question whether there
had been a Batson violation when the prosecutors in the case used four peremptory
challenges to strike the four African-American prospective jurors remaining on the
venire.s As a result of those peremptory challenges, Foster was tried by an all-white
jury, which convicted him and sentenced him to death. The trial judge held that
there had been no Batson violation,' and the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed.'
Years later, the state habeas court denied Foster's Batson daim and the Georgia
Supreme Court denied Foster's application for a Certificate of Probable Cause to
appeal.'Neither court was persuaded that there had been a Batson violation, even
though Foster had obtained and presented new evidence from the prosecutors'
notes indicating that the prosecutors had been motivated by race throughout the
jury selection.10 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, and in a seven-to-one decision,
held that there had been a Batson violation during jury selection at Foster's trial,
1 Radiolab Presents: More Perfect, WNYC STUDIOS (July 16, 2016),
http//www.wnyc.org/shows/radiolabmoreperfect [https://perma.cc/23ND-9S58].
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
Sean Rameswaram, Object Anyway, Radolab Presents:More Perfect, WNYC STUDIOS (July 16,
2016), http://www.wnyc.org/story/object-anyway/ [https//perma.cc/NZ6M-YHVA].
4 Foster filed a petition for writ of certiorari on January 30, 2015, and the U.S. Supreme Court
granted the petition for writ of certiorari on May 26, 2015. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Foster v.
Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737 (2016) (No. 14-8349); Foster v. Chatman Docket File, SUP. CT. U.S.,
https-//www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/1 4 - 83 4
9
.htm
[https://perma.cc/H8FC-QBR7] (last visited Mar. 26, 2017). The Court heard oral argument on
November 2, 2015, and issued an opinion on May 23, 2016. See Foster v. Chatman Docket fIve supra.
s Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Foster, 136 S. Ct. 1737 (No. 14-8349).
6 Section of trial transcript including argument on objection pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, Joint App.
Vol. I at 58, Foster, 136 S. Ct. 1737 (No. 14-8349) ("Well, the Court is satisfied that Batson has been
satisfied. The motion is overruled.") (quoting Judge John A. Frazier, Jr., Superior Court, Floyd County,
Rome, Georgia). After his trial, Foster also renewed his Batson challenge in a motion for a new trial,
but the trial judge denied the motion. See Order on Motion for New Trial, Joint App. Vol. I at 131,
144, Foster, 136 S. Ct. 1737 (No. 14-8349).
7 Foster v. State, 374 S.E.2d 188, 191-92 (Ga. 1988).
' Foster, 136 S. Ct. at 1743, 1745 (noting that the state habeas court order denied Foster's petition
for habeas relief, including his Batson claim); see Order Denying Petitioner's Request for Habeas Relief,
No. 1989-V-2275 (Ga. Super. Ct. Dec. 4, 2013).
9 See Foster, 136 S. Ct. at 1745.
'o'Te prosecutors' notes, obtained through the Georgia Open Records Act, included a venire list in
which African-American prospective jurors' names were highlighted in green marker, juror cards in
which African-American prospective jurors were indicated as "B#1," "B#2," and "B#3," and a 'definite
NO's" list, which included the names of the remaining African-American prospective jurors. Foster, 136
S. Ct. at 1743-44; see GA. CODE ANN. § 50-18-70 (West 2016).
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which had occurred almost thirty years ago. n To understand Foster, it was
necessary to go back to Barson, and that is exactly what the podcast Object Anyway
did.
With its exploration of Batson, the podcast makes several contributions to our
understanding of the case and it seems appropriate to reflect on these contributions
on this thirtieth anniversary of Batson. One contribution of the podcast is that it
takes us back to the people involved in the case and how they viewed their situation
at the time. It is all too easy when a case establishes a procedure-"a Batson
challenge," which is governed by an elaborate three-step testl 2-to lose sight of the
people who were involved in the case and how it affected them. A second
contribution is that the podcast teaches listeners that there is a possible solution:
the elimination of the peremptory challenge. The podcast provides arguments by
lawyers and academics in favor of and against that remedy. A third contribution is
that the podcast raises a provocative question to which it does not provide an
answer: Would the elimination of the peremptory challenge represent a loss of faith
in America?
The podcast's question is worthy of further reflection and exploration. In my
view, the elimination of the peremptory challenge shows faith in America, rather
than loss of faith. Batson and its progeny13 permit lawyers, when challenged, to give
reasons for their peremptory challenges that sound neutral, but are not. They have
learned how to circumvent Batson. The problem is that it is hard to show that
seemingly neutral reasons are based on purposeful discrimination. Thirty years ago,
the Court recognized that the test it had created in Swain v. Alabmad required a
"crippling burden of proof," 5 and so it refashioned the test in Batson, hoping that
it would prove to be less onerous. This has not been the case, however. A test that
does not do what it is supposed to do should be abandoned.
11 Foster, 136 S. Ct. at 1755.
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-97 (1986); see aso discussion infra Part I (describing the
three-step test in Batson).
1 The Batson test initially applied to the defense attorney's challenge of the prosecutor's exercise of
peremptories when the defendant was African American and the prosecutor sought to exclude African-
American prospective jurors from the petit jury. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 82-83. However, after
subsequent cases, which I refer to as "the Batson progeny," the test became applicable to defense
attorneys and civil parties and prohibited all parties of any race, gender, or ethnicity from using
peremptories to exclude prospective jurors based on these characteristics. SeeJ.E.B. v. Alabama earel.
T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (applying Batson to peremptory strikes exercised on the basis of gender);
Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992) (holding that criminal defendants were precluded by the
Fourteenth Amendment from exercising discriminatory peremptory challenges); Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 616 (1991) (applying Batson in civil cases); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400,
409 (1991) (extending Batson so that a criminal defendant can challenge a prosecutor's exercise of
peremptories based on race and need not be the same race as the excluded juror).
1 380 U.S. 202, 222-24 (1965) (holding that a peremptory challenge exercised on the basis of race
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but to prevail the defendant had to
show that the prosecutor had exercised discriminatory peremptories in case after case).
s Batson, 476 U.S. at 92.
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Not only should Batson be abandoned, but peremptories should be
eliminated.' 6 As long as peremptories exist, lawyers will continue to use them in a
discriminatory manner. Discriminatory peremptories pose a threat to the jury.
Some defendants who observe this practice will believe the jury will be stacked
against them and that they will not receive a fair trial. Some prospective jurors who
are struck for discriminatory reasons will believe that they have been denied their
right to serve on a jury because of their race, gender, or ethnicity. Discriminatory
peremptories also will lead the larger community to question the jury. Members of
the community usually accept a jury verdict, even when they disagree with it,
because they believe the process is fair. To the extent that discriminatory
peremptories undermine the fairness of jury selection, and make the jury look less
like America, they call into question the integrity of the jury and leave the jury
open to attack.
Parties, excluded jurors, and communities should not have to wait any longer
for a solution to this problem. They should be able to have faith in the jury and
faith in the fairness of the trial. Faith in the jury will contribute to faith in America.
The Swain test endured slightly more than twenty years and the Batson test is now
celebrating its thirtieth anniversary. Fifty years of experimentation should be
sufficient to establish that these tests do not work-they have not eliminated
discriminatory peremptory challenges. The only way to eliminate discriminatory
peremptories is to eliminate the peremptory challenge."
The Court in Batson expressed a commitment to a noble goal: ensuring
nondiscriminatory peremptory challenges. The Court believed that the test it
devised would accomplish this goal and allow the peremptory challenge to endure.
The aspirations expressed in Batson, and repeated in the opinions that expanded
Batson's reach'"reinforced the Court's commitment to nondiscrimination during
jury selection. As Justice Kennedy explained in Powers v. Ohio, the very integrity
1 I have urged the elimination of peremptory challenges in earlier articles as well. E.g., Nancy S.
Marder, Batson Revisited, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1585 (2012) (explaining why peremptory challenges
should be eliminated because the trial provided other mechanisms for ensuring impartial jurors)
[hereinafter Marder, Batson Revisited|; Nancy S. Marder, Beyond Gender: Peremptory Challenges and
the Roles of the Jury, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1041 (1995) (examining the Supreme Court's expansion of
Batson to gender and the problems with Batson and peremptory challenges) [hereinafter Marder,
Beyond Gender]; Nancy S. Marder, Justice Stevens, the Peremptory Challenge, and the jury, 74
FORDHAM L. REv. 1683 (2006) (examining Justice Stevens's views on the jury and how those views are
consistent with eliminating peremptory challenges, even though he did not adopt that position)
[hereinafter Marder, The Peremptory Challenge]; Nancy S. Marder, Two Weeks at the Old Bailey:Jury
Lessons from England, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 537, 551-56 (2011) (suggesting that the United States
could learn from England and Wales's experience and eliminate peremptory challenges as those
countries had done) [hereinafter Marder, Two Weeks at the Old BaileA.
17 See, e.g., Batson, 476 U.S. at 102, 108 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("[O]nly by banning
peremptories entirely can such discrimination be ended.").
" See supra note 13 (describing the Batson progeny).
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of the jury depends on rooting out the discriminatory peremptory challenge."' The
Court's commitment to nondiscriminatory peremptories did not falter, but the
practice in the courtroom has not lived up to the hopes expressed in Batson and its
progeny.
At some point-and the thirtieth anniversary seems an appropriate point-the
Court needs to revisit the Batson experiment and to note the disjuncture between
the goal of Batson, which is admirable, and how Batson plays out in the courtroom,
where it falls woefully short of its goal. If the Court were to take note of this failing
in the courtroom and abandon the Batson test and the peremptory challenge, it
would enable jury selection to work the way that the Court had envisioned in
Batson but had never achieved in practice. The failure of Batson in the courtroom
remains a threat to the jury. The elimination of the peremptory challenge, and with
it the discrimination that it continues to mask, is an antidote that can restore faith
in the American jury.
This Article, which will use the podcast Object Anyway as a jumping-off point
for reflections on Batson, will proceed in three parts. Part I will look back and
consider the people involved in Batson and the way they understood their situation.
Part II will look forward and consider the remedy that a number of lawyers and
academics, many of whom were interviewed for the podcast, have long
recommended. They now join Justice Marshall, who wrote a concurrence in
Batson" suggesting the elimination of the peremptory challenge. Finally, Part III
will pick up where the podcast left off and seek to answer the question raised at the
end of the podcast, which was: does the elimination of peremptory challenges
represent a loss of faith in America? One lawyer at the end of the podcast argued
against eliminating the peremptory challenge because it represents to him a loss of
faith in America. I argue that eliminating the peremptory challenge will help
restore Americans' faith in the jury system. Maintaining the Batson test, which is
ineffective in practice in spite of its lofty goals, will lead to cynicism about the jury
and a loss of faith in this important American institution.
I. LOOKING BACK
One of the contributions that the podcast Object Anyway makes to our
understanding of Batson v. Kentuckyis that it focuses on the people involved in the
case and includes interviews with them. Once a case has become famous as a legal
procedure it is easy to lose track of the people who were involved and the difference
the case made to their lives. The podcast reporter, Sean Rameswaram, traveled to
" 499 U.S. 400, 412 (1991) ("The overt wrong [of the discriminatory peremptory], often apparent
to the entire jury panel, casts doubt over the obligation of the parties, the jury, and indeed the court to
adhere to the law throughout the trial of the cause.").
2 Batson, 476 U.S. at 102 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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Louisville, Kentucky, and interviewed the two parties involved in the case.2 Their
story is important because it allows us to see how peremptory challenges affected
the people in the courtroom and how they perceived the fairness of the jury system.
James Kirkland Batson, an African-American man who is still a resident of
Louisville, Kentucky, was the defendant in Batson v. Kentucky.' He was charged
with burglary.Y He grew up in a rough part of Louisville and had no money.24 He
began stealing soda bottles to buy a pair of shoes. 25 He continued to steal small
items from houses-anything that could fit in his pockets-which earned him the
nickname "the pants pocket burglar."26 One day he was stopped by the police while
he was driving his car in an area where there had been a rash of burglaries, and he
was arrested. 27 He thought that the state would not have much of a case against
him because he had not been caught breaking and entering a house.28 He requested
a jury trial. 29
The state was represented by Prosecutor Joe Guttman, also from Louisville,
Kentucky and a newly-minted lawyer at the time.30 He told Rameswaram that
James Batson's case came up within his first six months in the Prosecutor's Office."'
He had already lost his first eight trials.3 2 The first time Batson's case went to trial
there was a hung jury." The hold-out juror, an African-American woman, spoke to
Batson after the trial and told him that she did not think he was guilty, which is
why the jury ended up as a hung jury.34 Guttman decided to retry Batson.3s At the
second trial, however, Guttman used four of his eight peremptory challenges to
strike the four African-American prospective jurors on the venire.' 6 This meant
that Batson was tried by an all-white jury.37 Thirty years later, Guttman does not
remember why he struck those four African-American prospective jurors, but he
told Rameswaram that "they were not stricken because of race."
211 am grateful to Sean Rameswaram, who provided me with a transcript of the podcast Object
Anyway. All citations to the podcast will be from this unofficial transcript. See Transcript: Object
Anywayat 2, (uly 16, 2016) (copy on file with author and law journal).
22 Id
2 See id. at 6.
24 Id. at 4.2 5 Id. at 4-5.
26 Id. at 5.
27 Id. at 5-6.
2 1 Id. at 6.
2 9 Id.
' Id. at 7.
31 Id
32 Id
" Id. at 8.
34 Id.
35 Id
36 Id at 11.
3 Id.
" Id. at 12 (quoting former prosecutor Joe Guttman).
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Batson was in the courtroom and watched as Guttman used four peremptory
challenges to remove all four African-American prospective jurors from the
venire." As Rameswaram describes the scene in the podcast: '[W]hat's important
for our story is to know that James Batson is sitting there in the [court]room as all
of this is happening."'o Batson could see that after the four African-American
prospective jurors were struck, "[e]verybody in the courtroom was white[,]" except
for Batson."1 Batson's lawyer was white; the prosecutor was white; the judge was
white, and after the peremptory challenges, all twelve jurors on his jury were
white. 42 Batson described the moment as follows: "And I'm like Ah! That's
completely - They struck all the blacks off the jury pool. It ain't right. I told my
lawyer, I said object to that ... ." His lawyer said that he had no basis to object,
but Batson insisted." Batson told his lawyer to "object anyway," and that is what
his lawyer did. 4 The case was able to reach the Supreme Court because of that
objection.4
The lower court judges did not find any merit to the objection raised by
Batson's lawyer. 47 The trial judge said that the prosecutor did not have to explain
his peremptories; the law did not require any explanation. 4' The jury convicted
Batson and the judge sentenced him to twenty years in prison. 49 The first thing
Batson did when he was in prison in Danville, Kentucky was to appeal the
judgment of the court below.so He was represented on appeal by David Niehaus
from the Public Defender's Office in Jefferson County, Kentucky. s Niehaus
started looking at other jurisdictions and found that prosecutors in many states
were using their peremptories to strike African-American prospective jurors from
the venire.52 He raised the issue on appeal and framed it as a violation of the Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution; the U.S. Supreme Court
agreed to hear the case."
In Batson v. Kentucky, the Court held that peremptories exercised on the basis
of race violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution.' In a compromise, which Chief Justice Burger described in his
39 Id.
Id. (quoting reporter Sean Rameswaram).
41Id. at 13 (quotingJames Batson).
42 Id. at 12-13.
' Id. at 12 (quotingJames Batson).
4 Id.
4s Id. at 13 (quoting James Batson).
4 Id. at 15.
47 Id. at 13.
48 Id.
4 Id. at 14.
5 Id.
51Id
52 Id. at 14-15.
s3 Id. at 16.
' Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986).
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dissent as a "curious hybrid," s the Court tried to maintain the tradition of
peremptory challenges and eliminate race-based peremptory challenges by the
prosecutor. The two goals, as Chief Justice Burger recognized in his dissent, were
incompatible and on a collision course. The essence of a peremptory challenge is
that it can be exercised for any reason at all without the attorney having to give an
explanation.s6 Batson required some peremptories to be explained." However, the
Court tried to limit the number of peremptories that would require explanation by
creating a test that the defendant would have to satisfy in order to challenge the
prosecutor's peremptory successfully.ss
The Court in Batson established a three-step test to determine if a peremptory
challenge was discriminatory.s9 In step one, the defendant has to establish a prima
facie case that the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge based on race.60 The
defendant could rely on the fact that he was a member of a cognizable group and
that the prosecutor had struck a prospective juror who was also a member of that
group. The defendant could also rely on the fact that peremptories provide a means
for "those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate."61 The defendant
could also rely on other facts to try to establish a prima facie case of purposeful-
discrimination. If the defendant meets this burden, then step two requires the
prosecutor to give reasons for his peremptory challenge. 62 The reasons have to be
race neutral and "related to the particular case to be tried." They do not have to
rise to the level of a for cause challenge," but the prosecutor cannot just say that he
had a hunch6 s or an "intuitive judgment."" Finally, at step three, the trial judge
decides whether the reason was pretextual or not; the burden remains with the
defendant to show that the prosecutor engaged in purposeful discrimination. 67
The podcast, with its emphasis on the people involved in the case, makes clear
that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Batson had real-life consequences for the
two parties. For James Batson, his twenty-year sentence was vacated and he was
ss Id. at 112, 126 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
56 Id. at 126-27.
s7 Id. at 127.
" See id. at 96-97 (providing guidance for establishing a prima facie case of a discriminatory
peremptory and describing the three-step test to establish a discriminatory peremptory challenge).
s' Id. at 96-97.
6 id.
61 Id. at 96 (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)).
62 See id. at 97.
6 Id. at 98.
6 Id. at 97 ("[W]e emphasize that the prosecutor's explanation need not rise to the level justifying
exercise of a challenge for cause.").
65 Id. at 98 ('Nor may the prosecutor rebut the defendant's case merely by denying that he had a
discriminatory motive or 'affirm[ing] [his] good faith in making individual selections.'") (quoting
Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972)).
" Id. at 97.
6 Id. at 98.
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released from prison." For Joe Guttman and other prosecutors throughout the
country, they immediately began to learn how "to get around Batson."6 1
Shortly after Batson was decided, another prosecutor, Jack McMahon, made a
video of his training for new prosecutors, and that video can be found on
YouTube.o One of the lessons that McMahon teaches new prosecutors is that they
can still use peremptory challenges to strike African-American prospective jurors
but they have to be able to give race-neutral reasons. During the training session,
he advises new prosecutors to question African-American jurors at length during
voir dire and "mark something down you can articulate [at a] later time . . . if
something happens."^ As long as the prosecutor does not give race as a reason-
and prosecutors quickly learned that lesson-Batson will not be a barrier to
discriminatory peremptory challenges. Batson only requires that a prosecutor give a
race-neutral reason and seemingly any race-neutral reason will do. McMahon
explained to Rameswaram on Object Anyway that his job as a prosecutor is to
win.' He feels an obligation to strike those prospective jurors who will be "more
questioning of [his] witnesses."7 ' He believes African Americans are more likely to
question police testimony and so he uses peremptories to remove them.74 His view
is: "[Y]ou're given the opportunity through peremptory challenges to strike [those
who will question your witnesses]. Why wouldn't you? You'd be a fool not to."7 s As
he explains to the young prosecutors he is lecturing, your job is to win; it is not to
be noble.76
II. LOOKING FORWARD
Another contribution that the podcast makes is to look forward and to ask
lawyers and academics how to address Batson's failings. Batson has failed because it
is easy for lawyers to evade and difficult for judges to enforce. The only adequate
remedy, as Justice Marshall suggested in his Batson concurrence, is the elimination
of peremptory challenges. In the thirty years since Batson, a growing number of
lawyers, judges, and academics have joined Justice Marshall in his view that the
only way to stop discrimination during jury selection is to eliminate peremptory
challenges. The podcast points to this solution going forward, but also raises some
lawyers' reservations about pursuing such a course.
Transcript: Object-Anyway, supra note 21, at 18.
69 Id. at 19 (quoting attorney Bryan Stevenson).
70 Jack McMahon, Jwy Selection with Jack McMahon, YOUTUBE,
https://www.youtube.com/watchkv=Ag21-L3mqsQ[https*//perma.cc/5L5X-FXD3].
71 Id. at 58:03.
Transcript: Object Anyway, supra note 21, at 27.
* Id. (quoting Jack McMahon).
7 McMahon, supra note 70, at 39:15.
7 Transcript: Object Anyway, supra note 21, at 27 (quoting Jack McMahon).
" McMahon, supra note 70, at 37:48.
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A. Reasons Are Easy for Lawyers to Give
Although Batson provided defense attorneys with a way to challenge
prosecutors' discriminatory peremptory challenges, it soon became apparent that it
would be hard for them to succeed on a Batson challenge. The prosecutor only had
to give a reason that was seemingly race neutral and related to the case to be tried. 7
After Purkett v. Elem, the reason did not even have to be related to the case.7 As
long as the prosecutor gave a seemingly race-neutral reason, it would be difficult,
and in some jurisdictions impossible, for a defendant to establish purposeful
discrimination. Some defendants did not even try. Others tried and found their
efforts thwarted, either by the prosecutor's seemingly race-neutral reason or the
judge's willingness to accept any reason at all, no matter how "silly,"79 as long as it
did not explicitly mention a prospective juror's race.
Over time, a litany of acceptable reasons developed, and prosecutors could
choose from among these reasons and be confident that the judge would typically
view any of these reasons as race neutral. Indeed, one judge compiled a list of
reasons, all supported by Illinois case law, that he thought prosecutors could
distribute under the tide "'Handy Race-Neutral Explanations' or '20 Time-Tested
Race-Neutral Explanations,'" which included such reasons as: "too old, too young,
divorced, 'long, unkempt hair,' free-lance writer, religion, social worker, renter, lack
of family contact, attempting to make eye-contact with defendant, 'lived in an area
consisting predominantly of apartment complexes,' single, [and] over-educated ...
"so
The podcast included an interview with Bryan Stevenson, a lawyer who often
represents African-American defendants in capital cases in the South."' He gave
examples of reasons that were farfetched and yet were accepted by judges as race
neutral. Stevenson, when he worked for the Southern Prisoners Defense
Committee in Atlanta, Georgia, had one case in which the prosecutor had used his
peremptories to exclude all the African-American prospective jurors on the
venire. 82 Stevenson objected and pointed to the Batson decision; the judge
understood it to mean that the prosecutor had to give race-neutral reasons, and the
prosecutor was ready with his race-neutral reasons.8t The prosecutor explained that
he struck one African-American woman "because she looks just like the
defendant," even though she was an African-American woman and the defendant
n Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 (1986).
7 See 514 U.S. 765, 768-69 (1995) (per curiam).
' Id. at 768.
" People v. Randall, 671 N.E.2d 60, 65-66 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (internal footnotes omitted).
S See Bryan Stevenson, EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE, http://eji.org/bryan-stevenson
[https://perma.cc/SN3S-EBE8] (last visited Mar. 28, 2017); Transcript: Object Anyway, supra note 21,
at 22-23.
' Transcript: ObjectAnyway, supra note 21, at 22.
8 Id.
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was an African-American man.' Stevenson recounted the judge's response: "And
the judge said, [o]h, I see that" and accepted the prosecutor's reason as race
neutral." With another peremptory, Stevenson recalled that the prosecutor said
that he struck an African-American prospective juror because the man said that he
was a mason and the prosecutor said that he did not want anybody who belonged
to a Masonic lodge on his jury.' When Stevenson put the prospective juror back
on the stand and asked him if was a member of a Masonic lodge, the man said:
"No. I'm not . .. I'm a brick mason!"" Nevertheless, the judge accepted the reason
and let the prosecutor strike the man from the jury."
Batson was intended to stop prosecutors from exercising their peremptories
against African-American prospective jurors so that African-American defendants
would not be denied their right to equal protection to have members of their own
race on the jury. However, Batson has not stopped prosecutors from exercising
race-based peremptories, and African-American defendants continue to be denied
their right under the Equal Protection Clause. Stevenson pointed not only to his
own cases, but also to statistics collected by the Equal Justice Initiative (EJI), for
which he serves as director. For example, EJI reported that Tennessee has not
reversed a single case under Batson in thirty years." In Houston County, Alabama,
eighty percent of the African Americans who qualified for jury duty were struck
during a five-year period.9 '
B. Enforcement Is Difficult forJudges To Do
Not only is it easy for lawyers to give seemingly race-neutral reasons for
peremptory challenges, but also it is difficult for judges to question whether
lawyers' reasons are really race neutral. Batson put trial judges in the difficult
position of having to decide whether the explanation a prosecutor offers is
pretextual or not. After the prosecutor has given a reason according to step two of
the Barson test, the trial judge must decide if it is race neutral in step three.' Few
prosecutors will give race as an explicit reason for exercising a peremptory
4 Id.
8 Id.
6 Id. at 23.
7 Id.
88 Id
" Id. at 19.
9 EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, ILLEGAL RACIAL DIsCRIMINATION IN JURY SELECTION: A
CONTINUING LEGACY 22 (Aug. 2010), http://eji.org/sites/default/files/iegal-racial-discrimination-
in-jury-selection.pdf [https://perma.cc/WG4M-TK5R] ("More than 100 criminal defendants have
raised Batson claims on appeal in Tennessee, but this state's courts have never reversed a criminal
conviction because of racial discrimination during jury selection.").
9' Id. at 14 (From 2005 to 2009, in cases where the death penalty has been imposed, prosecutors in
Houston County, Alabama, have used peremptory strikes to remove 80% of the African Americans
qualified for jury service.").
' Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97-98 (1986).
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challenge. Almost all other reasons will appear to be race neutral, even if the judge
does not see the relevance of the reason."nThe reason only has to be race neutral; it
does not have to be compelling.94
Few trial judges will press the prosecutor on his reasons. After all, the
prosecutor is a repeat player and an officer of the court. If the prosecutor gives a
reason that does not mention race explicitly, then it is hard for the judge to impugn
the integrity of the prosecutor by asking whether the prosecutor is really exercising
his peremptory based on race. As psychologists have pointed out, it is difficult for
people to recognize bias in themselves,95 and it is also difficult for one person to
discern bias in another person."6 Thus, the prosecutor might not even be aware of
his actual motivation, and in any event, it would be difficult for the judge to discern
that actual motivation.
The Supreme Court gave trial judges the responsibility of implementing
Batson. Justice Lewis Powell, writing for the majority in Batson, expressed faith
that trial judges would figure out how to proceed.97 Only Chief Justice Warren
Burger, writing in dissent, expressed grave reservations about the difficult task that
the Court had assigned to trial judges to perform." On the one hand, it makes
sense to leave such a determination to the trial judge, who is in the courtroom and
can see the prospective juror and the prosecutor and has heard their exchange
during voir dire. On the other hand, the trial judge is in the thick of things and
does not have much time to make a decision. In addition, the trial judge cannot
study the record in the same way as an appellate judge can and make comparisons
" See, e.g., Order on Motion for New Trial, supra note 6, at 138-41, 144 (describing the trial
judge's finding that even though some of the prosecutors' reasons were unlikely predictors of a juror's
behavior, the trial judge nevertheless found that the prosecutors' reasons were race neutral; therefore,
Timothy Tyrone Foster had failed to establish a Batson violation).
9 See Purkctt v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768-69 (1995) (stating that even if a reason is "silly or
superstitious," as long as it is race neutral it will not be prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause).
9 See, e.g., Regina Schuller & Neil Vidmar, The Canadian Criminal Jury, 86 CH.-KENT L. REV.
497, 522 (2011) ("More specifically, research related to aversive racism suggests that people may be
unaware of existing biases and often maintain that they are personally fair and egalitarian . . . .")
(footnote omitted); Neil Vidmar, When All of Us Are Victims:Juror Prjudice and "Terrorist" Trials,
78 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1143, 1150 (2003) ("[T]he juror may not be self-cognizant of his or her own
biases.").
' See, eg., Regina A. Schuller & Caroline Erentzen, The Challenge for Cause Procedure in
Canadian Criminal Law, 6 OfqATI Soclo-LEGAL SERIES 315, 329 (2016) ("It is diffscult to recognize
one's own prejudice, and even more difficult to admit to it in open court. It is perhaps more difficult yet
to recognize it in another person . . . .").
9 Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 99 ("We have confidence that trial judges, experienced in supervising voir
dire, will be able to decide if the circumstances concerning the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges
creates a prima facie case of discrimination against black jurors. ... We decline, however, to formulate
particular procedures to be followed upon a defendant's timely objection to a prosecutor's challenges.").
" Id. at 131 (Burger, CJ., dissenting) ("The Court essentially wishes these judges well as they begin
the difficult enterprise of sorting out the implications of the Court's newly created 'right.' I join my
colleagues in wishing the Nation's judges well as they struggle to grasp how to implement today's
holding.").
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between reasons the prosecutor gave to strike African-American prospective jurors
and whether those same reasons applied to any white jurors who were permitted to
serve." That comparison has proven to be one of the few ways to succeed on a
Batson challenge, but it requires having white jurors and black jurors with the same
characteristics.
The Supreme Court also instructed appellate courts to defer to trial judges
when reviewing Batson challenges.'"This means that appellate judges typically do
not make a very searching inquiry when reviewing Batson challenges, though there
have been some exceptions. Appellate judges explain that they have only the cold,
hard record before them, whereas the trial judge can see the participants, hear the
exchanges during voir dire, and observe the prosecutor as he or she gives reasons for
the peremptory. As the Seventh Circuit explained, "[t]he trial judge is clearly in the
best position to make that factual determination" 01 and the Seventh Circuit would
not disturb such a factual finding unless it is "completely outlandish or there is
other evidence [of] its falsity."102 As a result, appellate review does not serve as
much of a check on the trial judge's determination in a Batson challenge.
C. The OnlyAdequate Remedy: Eliminate Peremptory Challenges
Batson, though noble in purpose, has proven ineffective in practice and should
be abandoned; the only remedy that is adequate to the task is the elimination of the
peremptory challenge. Justice Marshall proposed this remedy thirty years ago in his
concurrence in Batson.103 He was forward-looking for his time, and still today. The
podcast pointed to this remedy and noted support for it among some academics
and lawyers, though support is far from universal. As one lawyer in the podcast
described Justice Marshall, "he was basically a fortune teller."'04
Justice Marshall recognized that Batson would be easy to circumvent.
Prosecutors could give reasons that would satisfy Batson even if they were actually
motivated by race.os Judges would be reluctant to push them to discover their true
" See, e.g., Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 478-80, 483-85 (2008) (noting that when a lawyer
gives one explanation for striking an African-American prospective juror, but does not exercise a strike
against a white prospective juror to whom that same reason applies, then that suggests the reason
justifying the strike was pretextual).
100 Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21 ("Since the trial judge's findings in the context under consideration
here largely will turn on evaluation of credibility, a reviewing court ordinarily should give those findings
great deference.").
1o1 Tinner v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 308 F3d 697, 703 (7th Cir. 2002).
Id. (quoting United States v. Stafford, 136 F.3d 1109, 1114 (7th Cir.), and modifed, 136 F.3d
1115 (1998)).
103 Batson, 476 U.S. at 102-03 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("The decision today will not end the
racial discrimination that peremptories inject into the jury-selection process. That goal can be
accomplished only by eliminating peremptory challenges entirely.").
o Transcript: ObjectAnyway, supra note 21, at 32 (quoting ACLU lawyer Jeff Robinson).I0 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 106 ("Any prosecutor can easily assert facially neutral reasons for striking
a juror, and trial courts are ill equipped to second-guess those reasons.").
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reasons, and sometimes prosecutors would not even be aware of their true reasons.
They could be motivated by unconscious biases that would lead them to strike
African-American prospective jurors from juries.'" For example, prosecutors might
say they are striking African-American prospective jurors because they look sullen
or aloof, but they might see these prospective jurors as sullen or aloof because of
their race and not because of any ostensible body language.'o Batson would not
enable prosecutors or judges to discern the underlying reasons for striking a juror.108
Thirty years of experimentation with Batson has proven Justice Marshall right.
Justice Marshall recognized that the Batson test would fall short and that the
only adequate remedy would be the elimination of the peremptory challenge. With
peremptory challenges, prosecutors would continue to exercise them based on race.
Without peremptory challenges, prosecutors would have to seat African-American
prospective jurors on the jury. The only way that prosecutors could remove them
would be if they satisfied a for cause challenge. A for cause challenge is available for
a limited number of reasons; the reasons have to be given in open court and the
judge makes the decision.
Over time, a number of academics and lawyers began to see the ineffectiveness
of Batson and the need to eliminate the peremptory challenge. 1"The reporter for
the podcast, Sean Rameswaram, interviewed a few lawyers and academics who took
this view. Attorney Stephen Bright, who often represents African-American
criminal defendants facing the death penalty in the South, described the
elimination of the peremptory as "a no-brainer."o He has seen prosecutors use
their peremptories to remove all the African-American prospective jurors from the
jury, so that his clients are tried by all-white juries, and judges never seem to find a
" Id. ("A prosecutor's own conscious or unconscious racism may lead him easily to the conclusion
that a prospective black juror is 'sullen,' or 'distant,' a characterization that would not have come to his
mind if a white juror had acted identically.").
107 See id.
o Id. ("A judge's own conscious or unconscious racism may lead him to accept such an explanation
as well supported.").
" For a sampling of recent academic articles critical of Batson, see Sheri Lynn Johnson, Batson
from the Very Bottom of the Well Critical Race Theory and the Supreme Court's Peremptory
Challenge jurisprudence, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 71, 88-90 (2014); Marder, Batson Revisited, supra
note 16, at 1586; Marder, The Peremptory Challenge, supra note 16, at 1683-84; Barbara O'Brien &
Catherine M. Grosso, Beyond Batson's Scrutiny- A Preliminary Look at Racial Disparities in
Prosecutorial Peremptory Strikes Following the Passage of the North Carolina Racial Justice Act, 46
U.C. DAViS L. REv. 1623, 1628 (2013); Antony Page, Batson's Blind-Spot: Unconscious Stereotyping
and the Peremptory Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REv. 155, 156 (2005); Tania Tetlow, Solving Batson, 56
WM. &MARY L. REv. 1859, 1859 (2015). For an extensive collection of early articles critical of Batson,
see People v. Bolling, 591 N.E.2d 1136, 1144-45 (1992) (Bellacosa, J., concurring) (providing
citations).
110 Transcript: Object Anyway, supra note 21, at 31 (quoting attorney Stephen Bright); see
Biography of Stephen B. Brght, S. CTR. FOR HUM. RTS.,
https://www.schr.org/about-us/staff/stephen-b-bright [https://perma.cc/2FKM-J3BP] (last visited
Apr. 2,2017).
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Batson violation. " Even Jack McMahon, the prosecutor who lectured new
prosecutors about how to select favorable jurors and how to be prepared for Batson
challenges, said that peremptories should just be eliminated: "Well, then don't give
them at all then, for crying out loud. It's real simple.. . .Take them away.""2 But
as long as McMahon is given peremptories, he will use them to remove jurors
whom he thinks will be critical of his case, including African-American jurors."'
He suggests that African-American jurors are likely to be critical of any police
testimony he might use. 114 As long as Batson exists, McMahon recommends that
new prosecutors question African-American prospective jurors extensively during
voir dire and write down some reasons that they can give in case they face a Batson
challenge.11 5 He tells new prosecutors that they should use their peremptories to
win, not for some noble purpose."' If peremptories exist, then he will use them in a
discriminatory fashion; the only way he will change his practice is if peremptories
do not exist. 1 7
The podcast notes that many lawyers believe that the peremptory challenge is
too important to be eliminated. Sean Rameswaram spoke to a number of lawyers
who thought that peremptories were integral to a fair trial.' 8 These lawyers did not
want to leave it to judges to eliminate questionable prospective jurors, particularly
when such prospective jurors said they could be fair.119 Once judges hear that
prospective jurors say they can be fair, they will not remove them.'"2 Some lawyers
believe that prospective jurors will not admit to bias in open court; others find that
prospective jurors might be unaware of their own biases. 12 ' These lawyers want the
opportunity to remove these prospective jurors on their own; they do not want to
rely on the judge.
One group that is not heard from in this podcast is judges. It is unclear whether
they were asked and declined to be interviewed, or whether they were not asked at
all. There are a growing number of judges, at every level of the judiciary, who are
beginning to question peremptory challenges. At the U.S. Supreme Court, Justice
Breyer has begun to question whether peremptories should be eliminated because
n See Transcript: ObjectAnyway, supra note 21, at 24, 28.
11 Id at 31-32 (quoting prosecutor Jack McMahon).
113 See id. at 27.
114 Id
us5 Id. at 21-22.
116 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.117 Transcript: Object Anyway, supra note 21, at 31.
us Id. at 33-35 (quoting ACLU lawyer Jeff Robinson, Legal Editor Elie Mystal, and Professor Sun
Wolf, Santa Clara University).
n
59 1d
1o Id. at 34-35.
uxId. at 35-37.
636 Vol. 105
Reflections Inspired by a Podcast
they continue to permit prosecutors to exercise discriminatory peremptories. 122
Justice Kennedy has not been as explicit in his opinions as Justice Breyer, but he
has suggested that preserving peremptories might come at too high a price,
particularly if they perpetuate racial stereotypes.23 justice Stevens, now retired from
the Court, questioned whether peremptories are needed because for cause
challenges are available.124 Although he viewed peremptories as an "inalienable
right" when he was a trial lawyer,1 25 he came to view them from the perspective of a
judge-first as a Seventh Circuit judge and then as a U.S. Supreme Court Justice.
From his vantage point as a judge, he became less convinced of the need for
peremptories and more focused on the plight of the excluded juror and the need to
protect the integrity of the jury.1asA growing number of trial judges in federal and
state courts around the country have begun to suggest that it is time to eliminate
the peremptory challenge.127 This is not surprising given that trial judges are
charged with Batson enforcement. They see how lawyers use peremptory
challenges every day and they have begun to call into question the need for them.
Academics offer yet another perspective. Many worry about the effects of the
discriminatory peremptory on the excluded juror, the parties, and the integrity of
the jury as an institution. Batson was the subject of academic criticism from the
beginning,' 28 and the opinion has continued to draw criticism with each passing
year. '2 Some academics have criticized Batson for its approach (Fourteenth
122 See, e.g, Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 344 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring) ("I have argued that
legal life without peremptories is no longer unthinkable. . . . I continue to believe that we should
reconsider Batsods test and the peremptory challenge system as a whole."); Miller-El v. Dretke, 554
U.S. 231, 272 (2005) (observing that "a jury system without peremptories is no longer unthinkable").
m Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 630 (1991) ("[I]f race stereotypes are the
price for acceptance of a jury panel as fair, the price is too high to meet the standard of the
Constitution.').
124 SeeJohn Paul Stevens, Foreword, 78 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 907, 907-08 (2003).
11 Id. at 907.
126 Id. (recognizing that peremptory challenges "produce minimal benefits at best" and involve
"significant cost[s]").
127 See, e.g., Minetos v. City Univ. of New York, 925 F. Supp. 177, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (opinion
of Judge Constance Baker Motley) (Time has proven Mr. Justice Marshall correct."); Commonwealth
v. Rodriguez, 931 N.E.2d 20, 43-44 (Mass. 2010) (Marshall, C.J., concurring) (writing "separately to
express ... [her] concern about the continued use of peremptory challenges"); People v. Boling, 591
N.E.2d 1136, 1142 (N.Y. 1992) (Bellacosa, J., concurring); Judge Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the
Gordian Knot of lmplicit Bias in jwy Selcation: The Problems offudge-Dominated Voir Dire, the
Failed Promise of Batson, and Proposed Solutions, 4 HARv. L. & POLY REV. 149, 167 (2010);
Raymond J. Broderick, Why the Peremptory Challenge Should Be Abolished, 65 TEMP. L. REv. 369,
370 (1992); Arthur L. Burnett, Sr., Abolish Peremptory Challenges: Reform Juries to Promote
Impartiality, 20 CRIM. JUST., Fall 2005, at 26, 27, 34; Morris B. Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges
Should Be Abolished: A Trialjudges Perspective, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 809, 810, 850 (1997); Gregory
E. Mize, On Better Jwy Selection: Spotting UFOJurors Before They Enter the Jury Room, CT. REv.,
Spring 1999, at 10.
128 See Bolling, 591 N.E.2d at 1144-45 (providing citations).
129 See Bennett, supra note 127; Broderick supra note 127; Burnett supra note 127; Hoffman, supra
note 127; Mize, supra note 127.
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Amendment versus Sixth Amendment) or its ineffectiveness. Batson attempts to
address discriminatory peremptories, but not in a way that makes a difference.
Thirty years of Batson has led to thirty years of criticism of Batson. Although the
podcast did a good job of giving voice to many lawyers' commitment to the
peremptory, it gave short shrift to the extensive commentary and critique by
academics and judges alike.
III. DOES ELIMINATING THE PEREMPTORY
REPRESENT Loss OF FAITH OR FAITH IN AMERICA?
Podcast reporter Sean Rameswaram, in the course of interviewing lawyers about
the peremptory challenge, spoke with ACLU lawyer Jeff Robinson, who suggested
that eliminating the peremptory challenge represents loss of faith in America.130
The podcast did not explore this point very deeply, but ended with the possibility
that Robinson might be right.'3 ' A perspective that the podcast did not consider is
that eliminating the peremptory challenge represents faith in America and its jury
system.
A. Ehiminating the Peremptory Represents a Loss ofFaith in America
ACLU lawyer Jeff Robinson argued that eliminating the peremptory challenge
represents a loss of faith in America. In his view, the peremptory challenge is an
invaluable tool and helps to ensure a fair trial. 3 2 He argues that trial lawyers should
not have to relinquish this essential tool. 3 3 Rather, all of us should have faith in
America and believe that someday lawyers will not use peremptory challenges in a
discriminatory manner.134 When that day arrives, the peremptory challenge will still
be available as an essential tool that helps to produce fair trials. Robinson does not
want to give up on his vision of America in which some time in the future
Americans will see past race and lawyers will no longer exercise peremptory
challenges in a discriminatory manner.
Robinson drew from his courtroom experience to explain why he thinks the
peremptory challenge is an essential tool for a fair trial. He described one trial he
had in the State of Washington that involved a coerced confession by some
undercover police.1 3s One of the prospective jurors was a police officer who said he
knew some of the police officers who had investigated the case, but the police
officer insisted that he could still be a fair juror in the case.'3 Robinson did not
" Transcript: ObjectAnyway, supra note 21, at 19, 37.
131 See id. at 37-38.
132 See id. at 34.
133 See id. at 37-38.
14See id.
13 Id. at 34.
16 Id. at 34-35.
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want him on the jury, but he believed that the judge would not excuse him for
cause. 3 7 In Robinson's view, "The judge would say, there's not a record for cause. I
don't think any judge in this country would dismiss that juror.""' Robinson argued
that without the peremptory challenge he would have no choice but to have that
police officer serve on his jury even though he was convinced that the police officer
could not be fair.
Robinson also drew from his personal life and explained that he did not think
either of his parents, both African Americans who had been active in the civil
rights movement, should sit on a criminal jury and that he would use peremptory
challenges to strike both of them from such a jury.1 39 Robinson described his
mother as someone who would blame the black criminal defendant for why she had
to lock her doors at night and why she was not shown respect when she went out
into the larger community.'40 He described his father as someone who would not
believe what a police officer said even if the police officer "told [him] it was raining,
and the water was coming down on [his] head."14' Robinson did not think either of
them should serve on a criminal jury. He did not want to leave that decision to a
judge because the judge would say there was not a record for cause, just as there was
"not a record for cause" in the case involving the prospective juror who was a police
officer. 42 However, if a lawyer used a peremptory challenge to exclude either of
Robinson's parents based on race, the lawyer would have failed to distinguish
between his mother, who might have been pro-prosecution, and his father, who
might have been pro-defense, according to Robinson's description. But of course,
Robinson described his parents only in the abstract. Even Robinson does not know
how his parents would have voted in a particular case, and they might have
surprised him.
Robinson, an admirer ofJustice Thurgood Marshall, nonetheless disagreed with
his proposal to eliminate peremptory challenges. He suggested that Justice
Marshall might have lost faith in America "to make these kinds of decisions."' 43 In
contrast, Robinson said that he still has faith in America and is "not prepared to
concede" that "we are so divided by race that we will never be able to try and fix
it."'" His hope is that some day peremptory challenges will no longer be used in a
discriminatory manner. When that day arrives, then we will still have peremptory
challenges and they will finally be used for the purpose for which they were
intended-to promote fair trials, not discrimination.
137 Id. at 35.
138 Id.
131 Id. at 37.
140 Id
141 d
14 21 d. at 35.
14 31 d. at 37.
1" Id. at 38.
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B. Ehminating the Peremptory Represents Faith in Amenca
Whereas Robinson sees the elimination of peremptory challenges as
representing loss of faith in America, I see it as representing faith in America.
Eliminating the peremptory challenge will mean that all citizens who meet the
basic juror qualifications can serve as jurors. 145 When we eliminate peremptories,
we will have eliminated the mechanism that continues to mask discrimination
during jury selection and that keeps qualified citizens from their rightful place on
juries. Excluded prospective jurors will no longer have to wait for some future day
to exercise their right to serve as jurors. Parties, and especially African-American
criminal defendants, will no longer have to wait for some future day to be tried by
juries that include a diverse group of citizens. The larger community will no longer
have to wait for some future day to see juries that are fairly selected and not selected
based on stereotypical notions about who can serve and who cannot serve as jurors.
The elimination of peremptories will mean that juries will have a better chance to
look more like America than they currently do. Even without peremptories, jurors
can act impartially. They usually try to fulfill their role as jurors as responsibly as
possible. In my view, eliminating the peremptory challenge represents a faith in
America and in Americans to perform their civic duty as jurors.
i. Peremptories Mask Discrimination During Jury Selection
Peremptories serve as a mask for discrimination. As the Supreme Court noted
in Batson, peremptories are the mechanism by which those who are of a mind to
discriminate can discriminate during jury selection. " If the peremptory were
eliminated, then the means by which lawyers discriminate during jury selection
would no longer exist. The peremptory provides cover for the discrimination; when
the peremptory is eliminated, then the bad behavior during jury selection will also
cease.
The podcast made clear that some lawyers will engage in discriminatory
peremptories as long as peremptories exist because they want to win, but once
peremptories have been eliminated, both sides are in the same position and neither
side can engage in the discrimination that peremptories permit. Jack McMahon,
the prosecutor who lectured new prosecutors on how to select a jury, said that he
would continue to strike African Americans from his jury because he believed they
would be unsympathetic jurors.'"7 He regarded it as part of his job to select a jury
that would favor his side. He would continue to use peremptories in this manner
because he thought it advantageous. If peremptories were eliminated, however,
145 See28 U.S.C. § 1865 (2016) (specifying qualifications for jury service in federal district courts).
* Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986) ("[lPeremptory challenges constitute a jury selection
practice that permits 'those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate.'") (quoting Avery v.
Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)).
147 Transcript: ObjectAnyway, supra note 21, at 27.
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then he would no longer engage in discriminatory peremptories. The solution, he
explained in the podcast, was to eliminate the peremptory, rather than to ask him
to do something that was counter to his goal of winning. 148 In his view,
discriminatory peremptories help him to win, but of course, he did not offer any
empirical evidence to support his claim, just anecdotal experience.
With the end of discriminatory peremptories, the parties, the excluded jurors,
and the larger community could have faith in the trial; they would not have to wait
for some future date. Currently, parties, such as James Batson, have to sit in the
courtroom during jury selection and watch as the prosecutor strikes every African-
American prospective juror from their jury. As Batson observed during jury
selection in his case, "[The prosecutors] struck all the blacks off the jury pool. It
ain't right." 149 Although the Batson test is supposed to stop discriminatory
peremptories, it falls short. It permits a party to object, but it is still hard for the
objecting party to succeed. Batson was not a lawyer, but he knew that the practice
of discriminatory peremptories was wrong. This intuition spurred him to tell his
lawyer to "object anyway!"15 With the elimination of the peremptory, Batson and
others in his situation can have faith that the jury that tries them will not have been
fashioned through discriminatory peremptories exercised during jury selection.
If peremptories are eliminated, then prospective jurors who have been excluded
based on discrimination also will have renewed faith in the jury. They will no
longer be excluded impermissibly. Even though judges explain to prospective jurors
that each side has a certain number of peremptory challenges and the prospective
jurors should not take it personally if they are struck by one side or the other, they
are present in the courtroom and can see if people of one race, ethnicity, or gender
are being excluded."s' The EI Report provided a number of accounts of African-
American prospective jurors in Southern states who were struck for reasons that
they knew to be false and that they viewed as a cover for racial discrimination. The
experience left them feeling "unworthy,"15 2 "false[ly] accus[ed],"' 5 and convinced of
the unfairness of the system, even years afterward. 154 As Melodie Harris, a
prospective juror in the trial of Alvin Robinson, remarked about her exclusion and
14s Id. at 31 ("Well, then don't give [peremptory challenges] at all then, for crying out loud. Its real
simple.") (quoting prosecutor Jack McMahon).
149 Id. at 12 (quoting James Batson).
Id. at 13 (quoting James Batson).
1s1 See Mary R. Rose, A Voir Dire of Voir Dire: Listening to jurors' Views Regarding the
Peremptory Challenge, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1061, 1097 (2003) ("Jurors seemed to realize that jury
selection is only partly about them.").
152 EQUAL JUSTICE IN1TIATIVE, supra note 90, at 30 (describing excluded prospective juror Allen
Mason).
153 Id. at 29 (describing excluded prospective juror Brenda Greene).
154 Id. ("Mrs. Greene desperately wanted to clear her family's name, even though the statements
were made in 1992."); id. at 30 ("Nearly 20 years later, Mr. Mason grew emotional as he recalled how
the prosecutor's racist actions made him feel unworthy.").
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that of other blacks in the trial: "It was just so blatant." 5 5 In their eyes, jury
selection was not operating fairly. Peremptories allowed prosecutors to act in a
discriminatory manner, Batson notwithstanding. Only the elimination of
peremptories will allow these citizens to serve on juries, which would at least
provide a first step in restoring their faith in America.
Discriminatory peremptories reach beyond those in the courtroom and
adversely affect the larger communitys view of the fairness of the trial. The
elimination of the peremptory would also begin to restore the larger community's
faith in America. As Justice Kennedy observed in Powers v. Ohio, jury selection
marks the beginning of the trial and if it is marred by discriminatory peremptories
then it will cast doubt on the integrity of the entire trial. 156 The harm that is done
during jury selection taints the entire proceeding and reaches beyond those in the
courtroom. If the larger community is going to accept the verdict, even if it
disagrees with it, then it needs to be convinced of the fairness of the process.
Discriminatory peremptories undercut that fairness.
The elimination of the peremptory will allow those in the courtroom and those
outside the courtroom to see that jury selection was conducted fairly. In contrast, a
jury selection that is marred by discriminatory peremptories signals to trial
participants and to the larger community that they have to wait for a fair system.
The message is that there is "unequal justice"157 and little that they can do to
change the inequities now. The elimination of peremptories is not a panacea for all
discrimination in the criminal justice system, but it is a first step for ending
discrimination at the start of the trial.
ii. Jurors Take Their Role Seriously
Although everybody has biases, citizens who serve as jurors take their role
seriously and try to perform it as responsibly as possible. They might not welcome
their jury summons and they might enter the courtroom prepared to give their
excuses to the judge, 5 but those who are selected to serve usually try hard to learn
their role and to serve as impartial decision-makers. This view of jurors as
performing their job ably suggests that we should have faith in Americans to
perform this civic duty. Whereas Robinson is suspicious about people and their
.ss Id. at 28 (quoting excluded prospective juror Melodie Harris).
156 499 U.S. 400, 411 (1991) ("[R]acial discrimination in the selection of jurors 'casts doubt on the
integrity of the judicial process,' . . . and places the fairness of a criminal proceeding in doubt.") (quoting
Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 556 (1979))).
7 EQuAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 90, at 29 (quoting excluded prospective juror Gerald
Mercer).
1ss See, eg., D. GRAHAM BURNETr, A TRIAL BY JURY 17, 27-29 (2001) (describing jury duty,
first as an "unwelcome interruption," but then during voir dire it became "a rare opportunity to
participate in something important, weighty, [and] real").
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biases and therefore needs the peremptory to allay his suspicions,' 9 I rely on the
power of the juror's role and the judge-jury relationship to ensure that those who
are permitted to serve as jurors will, for the most part, perform their role
responsibly. The role of juror and the education throughout the trial process enable
the jurors to perform impartially, making the peremptory less needed than
Robinson assumes.
In other writing, I have described the transformation of "reluctant citizens" into
responsible jurors. "o There is almost a palpable moment during voir dire when
prospective jurors stop looking for hardship excuses and start thinking about
serving as jurors.161 They might have entered the courtroom eager to be excused,
but as they sit in the jury box, and observe the formal setting, the parties before
them, and the lawyers, judge, and other trial participants, they begin to understand
and embrace the enormity of the task before them.162 Although voir dire introduces
jurors to their role, the lessons are reinforced at every stage of the proceedings-from
the oath they take, to the instructions they hear, to the deliberations that they
conduct behind closed doors, to the announcement of their verdict in open court.6 3
I attribute this transformation from reluctant citizen to responsible juror not
only to the power of the role of juror, but also to the relationship between judge
and juror throughout the trial. The judge is the authority figure in the courtroom.
Most jurors look up to the judge and learn about the trial from the judge. The
judge teaches jurors about their role throughout the entire trial. The judge begins
this process of educating jurors during voir dire, and ends it, at least in some
courtrooms, by meeting with the jurors after they have been dismissed, answering
any remaining questions, thanking them for their service, and advising them that
they are not required to talk to anyone, including the attorneys and the press, about
their jury service; it is up to them to decide.'" The jurors also look to the judge to
learn about the law. Some judges give preliminary instructions about the case, as-
" Transcript: Object Anyway, supra note 21, at 36-37 ("But the way Jeffrey Robinson put it to me
was that if you're using peremptory challenges the right way, it forces you to be like equal opportunity
suspicious, suspicious of everyone. And that's the only way to be fair.").
"o See Nancy S. Marder, Juror Bias, Voir Dire, and the Judge-JuryRelationsip, 90 CI-I.-KENT L.
REv. 927, 939-42, 955 (2015) [hereinafter Marder, Juror Bias].
"I Id. at 939-42.
162 See, e.g., BURNET, supra note 158, at 17, 26-31 (describing a prospective juror's experience
during the voir dire process); Deborah J. Golder, Reflections: A Different Duty, AM. J. NURSING, Aug.
1990, at 92, 92 (describing feelings of being 'relieved" but also "disappointed" when not chosen to sit on
a criminal jury); Dan Hatfield, Jury Service an Engaging Adventure, JUDGES' J., Fall 2004, at 34, 36
('Surprisingly, that [excusal] was a bittersweet moment for me. I had gone from wanting to get out of
this jury service], to a heartfelt obligation to serve.").
1 See Marder, Batson Revisited, supra note 16, at 1601-06, 1610-11 (describing a "process view"
of the jury in which jurors are educated about their role at every stage of the trial proceedings, from voir
dire to instructions to deliberations).
1" See Marder, Juror Bias, supra note 160, at 942-45, 948-55 (describing the ways in which the
judge teaches the jury about its role throughout the trial process, beginning with voir dire and ending
with a meeting after the trial has ended).
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needed instructions during the trial, and then final instructions either before or
after the attorneys' dosing argument, but in any event, before the jury begins its
deliberations.16  The ongoing instructions are another way by which the judge
continues to educate the jurors at every stage of the trial.
Polls and empirical studies show that jurors take their role seriously, try to
perform it responsibly, and might even become more active citizens after having
completed their jury service. One of the most enduring movie portrayals of the jury,
12 Angry Men,'" depicts jurors who are reluctant at first to deliberate, but who
eventually embrace their role as jurors and perform it quite responsibly."'7 Polls of
actual jurors who have completed jury service show that they believe they have done
a good job and have taken their role seriously.'6" People also usually think more
highly of the jury system after having served as jurors.'16 Some empirical studies
have shown that citizens who serve on juries in some kinds of cases become more
active citizens after serving. 170 For example, they engage in other civic
responsibilities, such as voting.
The role of juror and the guidance provided by the judge lead ordinary citizens
to take their juror responsibilities seriously and to perform as jurors as ably and as
impartially as possible. Thus, the experience of being a juror can transform those
who serve. It is not surprising that many who have served recall that experience
years later.' 7 1 Jurors learn throughout the trial how to be good jurors. It is an
15 See id. at 948-49.
166 See 12 ANGRY MEN (Orion Nova Productions 1957).
.. See generally Symposium, The 50th Anniversary of12 Angry Men, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 557
(2007).
16 See, e.g., Editorial, The Perfectjuror?, NAT'L LJ., May 2, 1994, at 14 ("As shown in last year's
National Law Journal poll of nearly 1,000 jurors, most of them take their jobs seriously and try to follow
the law as best they can.").
16 See, e.g., Stephanie Simon & Amy Dockser Marcus, Jurors Don't Mnd Duty, Survey Finds,
WALL ST. J., July 3, 1991, at B3 ("More than 80% [of jurors] said they came away with a favorable view
of their service, according to the survey of 8,468 jurors by the National Center for State Courts."); New
Poll Showts Strong Support forJury System; Incoming ABA President Calls on Americans to Act on
Their Beiefs, MEDIA.AMERICANBAR.ORG. (Aug. 9, 2004),
https://americanbarassociation.wordpress.com/2004/08/09/new-poll-shows-strong-support-for-jury-
system-incoming-aba-president-calls-on-americans-to-act-on-their-beliefs/ [https://perma.cc/3C5A-
7TRH](describing the results of an ABA survey).
170 See, e.g., JOHN GASTIL ET AL., THE JURY AND DEMOCRACY: How JURY DELIBERATION
PROMOTES CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND POLICAL PARTICIPATION 48-49 (2010) (finding that jury
service in criminal trials increased voting among low-frequency voters); Valerie P. Hans et al.,
Delberative Democracy and the American Civil Jury, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 697, 712 (2014)
(finding that jury service in civil trials increased voting, depending on jury size, unanimity rule,
defendant identity, and case type).
171 See, eg., Rick Rojas & Kate Pastor, Retrial in Etan Patz Case Starts With a Tough Question:
Who can Sit on the Jury?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/13/nyregion/etan-patz-retrial-jury.html?_r-0
[https://perma.cc/C6CK-8ALX] ("The people who serve on this case [the trial of Pedro Hernandez for
the murder of Etan Patz] . . . will find this to be one of the more important things they do in their lives .
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ongoing and educational experience. Most Americans can learn how to be good
jurors-even Robinson's parents. However, for those people who cannot learn
because their views are too fixed, there are always for cause challenges.
iii. Judges and More Flexible For Cause Challenges
With the elimination of peremptory challenges, judges are likely to be more
generous with for cause challenges. As long as peremptories exist, judges can be
strict about for cause challenges because they know that lawyers can always use a
peremptory to remove a prospective juror about whom they have doubts. If
peremptories were eliminated, then judges are likely to take a more generous view
and not limit for cause challenges only to the traditional bases.
Traditionally, judges grant for cause challenges in only a limited number of
circumstances. They grant them when there is a familial connection between the
prospective juror and one of the trial participants, when the prospective juror has a
financial stake in the outcome of the trial, or when the prospective juror says that
he or she cannot be impartial. 172 One feature that distinguishes a for cause
challenge from a peremptory challenge is that a reason must be given in open court
for the for cause challenge, whereas a peremptory does not require any reason at all
(unless challenged). Other distinguishing features between for cause challenges and
peremptory challenges are that for cause challenges are not limited to a set number
and the judge decides whether to grant them, in contrast to peremptory challenges,
where a set number are allotted to each party and left to the attorney to exercise.
Attorneys worry that without the peremptory challenge they will simply be left
with the for cause challenge that is decided by the judge and is granted in only a
limited number of circumstances. They are reluctant to trust judges with this power
and to cede control over who sits on their jury. They have little faith that judges
will do the right thing. However, judges are likely to grant very few for cause
challenges now because they know that lawyers have peremptory challenges. If a
judge fails to grant a for cause challenge when he or she should have, the lawyer can
correct the error by exercising a peremptory challenge. 173 If peremptory challenges
were eliminated, however, judges would likely grant for cause challenges more
readily, knowing there would no longer be any back-up mechanism if they made a
mistake.
Attorneys assume that without peremptories, judges will grant for cause
challenges the same way they do when there are peremptory challenges. However,
. . . It's the kind of thing you can tell your grandchildren about.") (quoting Justice Wiley, who also
presided over Hernandez's first trial).
172 SeeHopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430, 433 (1887).
173 See e.g., United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 317 (2000) (holding that Martinez-
Salazar's exercise of a peremptory challenge to remove a juror who should have been excused for cause
did not violate Martinez-Salazar's exercise of peremptory challenges pursuant to Rule 24(b) of the
Federal Rules ofCriminal Procedure or his right to due process under the Fifth Amendment).
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institutional practices are not fixed in stone. A change in one practice is likely to
lead to changes in other practices. Just because for cause challenges are granted in
only limited circumstances now does not mean that they would continue to be
granted in such limited circumstances if peremptories were eliminated. Judges have
discretion to decide when to grant a for cause challenge. They can exercise that
discretion narrowly or broadly. Attorneys assume they will exercise this discretion
narrowly if there were no peremptories, but judges are likely to err on the'side of
caution and exercise it broadly. It would behoove judges to do so, both to reassure
lawyers and parties that only impartial jurors will be seated on the jury and also to
avoid the possibility of a retrial. However, even if judges grant for cause challenges
more generously if there are no longer peremptory challenges, the for cause
challenge would not become a peremptory because a reason would still have to be
given in open court.
iv. Diverse Juries
If peremptory challenges were eliminated, then juries would be more diverse.
One benefit is that juries would then "look more like America" and help the public
to have faith in the jury as an institution. Another benefit is that jurors, coming
from different walks of life, would have different perspectives from which to view
the evidence. Different viewpoints would lead to more thorough deliberations that
could produce more well-reasoned verdicts.
If peremptories were eliminated, then jury selection would be random and
would likely result in juries that are diverse. Currently, lawyers seem to use
peremptories to strike African-American or other minority prospective jurors from
the jury. Without this mechanism, jurors would be selected randomly and would
only be removed for hardship or for cause. They could not be removed because of
their race, gender, or ethnicity. Although Batson and its progeny are supposed to
limit this practice, they are ineffective. Other countries, such as England and
Wales, that wanted their juries to be more representative of their citizenry, 174
eliminated peremptory challenges.17 s As a result, they now have juries that appear
to be more representative,61 7 and citizens can see that change. Another benefit is
that their jury selection proceeds quickly, the first twelve jurors, who are randomly
selected, are permitted to serve.17 7
17 See Laura K. Donohue, Terrorism and Trial byjury. The Vices and Virtues of British and
American Crininal Law, 59 STAN. L. REv. 1321, 1345 (2007) ("A jury should represent a cross-section
drawn at random from the community, and should be the means of bringing to bear on the issues the
corporate good sense of that community.") (quoting DEPARTMENTAL COMM. ON JURY SERV.,
REPORT, 1965, Cmnd. 2627, ¶ 53).
175 See Criminal Justice Act 1988, c. 33, § 118(1) (Eng. &Wales).
176 See, eg., Marder, Two Weeks at the Old Bailey, supra note 16, at 552 (providing a description
of how jury selection works at the Old Bailey and why juries are likely to be more diverse, but
admittedly, it is based on a small number ofjuries over a two-week period).
1
n Id.
646 Vol. 105
Reflections Inspired by a Podcast
The elimination of peremptories not only gives juries the appearance of
diversity but also gives juries the benefit of diversity during deliberations. The
Supreme Court has described the benefit of having a sufficient number of jurors on
the jury so that the group will benefit from different assessments of the evidence
and recollections of the facts."' Other court opinions have tried to describe the
benefits of having women' 79 or African Americans on the venireso (though the
Court stopped short of requiring petit juries that are representative).' 8' Although
these opinions have been careful to say that not all members of these groups will
vote in any particular way,'" they describe the benefits of having different points of
view available for group consideration. Some psychologists have suggested that
having jurors who can contribute different recollections of the facts or evidence or
correct mistaken views of other jurors will lead to more robust deliberations. as
Others have suggested that the presence of African Americans on the jury leads
white jurors to engage in more careful and thorough deliberations.' In one study,
.. See, e.g., Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 232-38 (1978) (relying on empirical studies, the
Supreme Court concluded that a jury consisting of fewer than six persons might impair jury fact-
finding, be more susceptible to individual biases and group errors, produce more inconsistent and
unreliable verdicts, decrease the likelihood of hung juries, and lead to less minority representation).
`9 See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 525 (1975) (holding that the systematic exclusion of
women from the venire violated a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury drawn from a fair cross-
section of the community); Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193 (1946) (relying on the
supervisory powers of the federal courts, the Court held that the exclusion of women from the venire
was impermissible); id. at 193 ("[I]f the shoe were on the other foot, who would claim that a jury was
truly representative of the community if all men were intentionally and systematically excluded from the
panel?).
"s See, e.g., Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 505 (1972) (holding that if African-American men were
systematically excluded from the venire such exclusion would be unconstitutional and that the challenge
could be raised by a defendant regardless of his race); id. at 503 ("When any large and identifiable
segment of the community is excluded from jury service, the effect is to remove from the jury room
qualities of human nature and varieties of human experience, the range of which is unknown and
perhaps unknowable.").
1s1 See, e.g., Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538 ("[I]n holding that petit juries must be drawn from a source
fairly representative of the community we impose no requirement that petit juries actually chosen must
mirror the community. . . .").
182 See, e.g., Peters, 407 U.S. at 503-04 ("It is not necessary to assume that the excluded group will
consistently vote as a class in order to conclude, as we do, that its exclusion deprives the jury of a
perspective on human events that may have unsuspected importance in any case that may be
presented.").
"3 See, e.g., VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 50 (1986) ("[A] jury
composed of individuals with a wide range of experiences, backgrounds, and knowledge is more likely to
perceive the facts from different perspectives and thus engage in a vigorous and thorough debate.").
1 See, e.g., Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and Group Decision Making: Identiifng
Multiple Effects ofRacial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
597, 604-06 (2006) (describing the findings of an empirical study using mock jurors in which white
jurors on racially diverse juries discussed more facts, made fewer inaccurate statements, and considered
more race-related topics than white jurors on homogeneous juries); see also Samuel R. Sommers &
Phoebe C. Ellsworth, How Much Do We Really Know About Race and juries? A Review of Social
Science Theory and Research, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 997, 1025 (2003) ("[Mjembership on a racially
heterogeneous jury might also influence White jurors' behavior during deliberations."); id. at 1028-29.
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jurors on juries that were more diverse by gender (meaning more of a mix of men
and women) found the deliberations to be more thorough and satisfying than jurors
on juries that consisted mainly of women or mainly of men.'s
Juries that look diverse and are diverse should be our aspiration. Such juries will
lead the parties, jurors, and the broader community to have faith in the jury system.
Peremptories stand in the way of that goal. Although peremptories are supposed to
reassure the parties that the jury will be impartial, they do not serve that function as
long as they are used in a discriminatory manner. Defendants like James Batson did
not have faith in his jury as he watched prosecutor Joe Guttman exclude every
African-American prospective juror on the venire through the exercise of
peremptory challenges." Batson felt that the process was unfair and that the jury
was stacked against him. Similarly, prospective jurors like Melodie Harris did not
have faith in the jury system as she and other African Americans were struck from
the jury because of their race."' It is hard to see how the peremptory challenge
represents faith in America to James Batson or Melodie Harris. If their experience
in the courtroom demonstrates that jury selection is rigged, the larger community is
likely to share that feeling and lack faith in this American institution.
CONCLUSION
It seems fitting on the thirtieth anniversary of Batson v. Kentuckc'f to assess
how Batson is faring in terms of eliminating discriminatory peremptory challenges
and to recognize that it is not doing well. The Batson test is all too easy to evade. A
lawyer needs only to provide a seemingly race-neutral reason for the exercise of a
peremptory challenge, and thirty years of Batson have provided many reasons from
which to choose. In addition, Batson remains difficult for trial judges to enforce.
They are being asked to do the impossible: to discern whether a seemingly race-
neutral reason is in fact pretextual. Without a "smoking gun," there is little chance
that trial judges will find the reason pretextual. Moreover, appellate courts tend to
be deferential to the trial judge's determination. After all, the trial judge is present
in the courtroom and able to see and hear the prospective jurors, which the
appellate judges cannot do.
The podcast Object Anywaf" has made several contributions to the debate on
peremptory challenges; in particular, it has captured the voices and views of the
participants in Batson and made them available to a wide audience, including lay
people, lawyers, and law students. The podcast has also explained a technical area
of the law-the law of peremptory challenges-in a way that both legal
8 5 Nancy S. Marder, Juries, Justice &Multiculturalism, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 659, 663, 687-88, 692,
694 (2002).
1" Transcript: ObjectAnyway, supr note 21, at 12.
1" EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 90, at 28.
188 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
1
" SeegenerallyTranscript: ObjestAnyway, supra note 21.
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professionals and lay people can understand. However, the podcast raises, but does
not explore, ACLU lawyer Jeff Robinson's claim that peremptory challenges should
endure because they represent faith in America.'" To Robinson, peremptories are
an invaluable tool for securing an impartial jury and should not be eliminated
simply because they are exercised in a discriminatory manner.'9' He holds out hope
that someday lawyers will exercise peremptory challenges fairly and then parties will
benefit from having such a tool.
I disagree with Robinson's claim and suggest that eliminating peremptories
represents faith in America and the American institution of the jury.
Discriminatory peremptories leave parties feeling that the jury has been stacked
against them, as James Batson explained in his interview with Sean
Rameswaram.'" Peremptories also leave excluded jurors feeling that they have been
judged to be inferior and that the jury system cannot be fair if it impugns their
integrity and ability to serve as jurors. Discriminatory peremptories also leave the
community suspicious of jury selection and the trial that follows, as Justice
Kennedy explained in Powers v. Ohio.ln
When peremptories are eliminated and no group is excluded from serving on
the jury because of their race, gender, or ethnicity, then jury selection will function
as it should. Jurors will be selected randomly and juries will be more diverse than
they are now. Although Jeff Robinson is suspicious about prospective jurors who
say they can be impartial and he would prefer having peremptories to keep some
prospective jurors off the jury, I maintain that these prospective jurors can serve and
that they will try to perform their job as ably as possible. By virtue of jurors' role
and the education the judge provides them throughout the trial, all jurors-
including Robinson's parents-will perform their task responsibly. Robinson might
criticize this view as naive or optimistic, but it reflects a faith in jurors and the
American jury system that he fails to recognize. He looks to peremptory challenges
for reassurance, whereas I look to jurors and the judge-jury relationship for support.
19 Id. at 37-38.
191 See id. at 36-37.
192 See id. at 12.
193 499 U.S. 400, 412-13 (1991) ("The composition of the trier of fact itself is called in question,
and the irregularity may pervade all the proceedings that follow.").
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